Placement of Weapons in Outer Space: The Dichotomy Between Word and Deed

The year 2020 ended with a new anti-satellite test that could be the foreteller of increasing tensions in outer space and the continuation of the space arms race. Russia conducted a test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) on Dec. 15, which garnered the criticism of the United States: U.S. Army Gen. James Dickinson, commander of the U.S. Space Command, stated that “Russia publicly claims it is working to prevent the transformation of outer space into a battlefield, yet at the same time Moscow continues to weaponize space by developing and fielding on-orbit and ground-based capabilities that seek to exploit U.S. reliance on space-based systems.”

However, the year’s end also brought with it yet another attempt to curb the weaponization of outer space: the adoption of the Draft Resolution on Responsible Behaviours in Outer Space at the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 7. This resolution, titled “Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours,” was originally proposed by the United Kingdom in August and seeks to identify existing and potential threats, as well as irresponsible or potentially threatening activities, for international security with an eye toward developing and implementing “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.”

The contradiction between the international community’s diplomatic efforts to temper tensions in outer space and prevent the acceleration of the space arms race, on the one hand, and the continuous tests of counterspace technology that contribute to the escalation of such friction, on the other, is evidence that reaching true consensus on behavioral rules in outer space is no easy task. 

Does Law Allow the Use of Weapons in Outer Space?

One of the best-known expressions regarding the use of outer space is that it shall be used for “peaceful purposes.” This term, often used in diplomatic discourse, interestingly appears only twice in space law’s Magna Carta—the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer Space Treaty. That document states in its preamble that there is a “common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,” and Article IV of the treaty establishes that “[t]he Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all State Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The Outer Space Treaty does not define“peaceful purposes”; thus, the international community has interpreted it to mean “nonaggressive” or “nonhostile” rather than “nonmilitary.” 

Although several states initially disagreed with this interpretation, most ended up aligning with the United States’s assertion—highlighted in its 2020 National Space Policy—that the principle of the use of space for peaceful purposes is consistent with national security activities in space, including the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. As a result of this interpretation, outer space is nowadays crawling with satellites used for military purposes such as intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, navigation, targeting over battlefields, early warning of missile and air attacks, or military communications, usually without protest from the international community. 

Generally, the more technologically advanced a state is, the more of these space assets it has and, therefore, the greater its interest in ensuring their safety. To that extent, the more a state relies on space technology, the more significant its vulnerability, as space assets are easily targetable and difficult to defend due to the predictability of their movements. In the face of this, states have sought to protect their interests in space through the development and testing of counterspace technology—weapons designed to impair or destroy space assets. Russia’s direct-ascent ASAT test in December is an example of this, and while the international community may express its dismay and condemn such actions, as the United States did, the existing space law regime does not expressly denounce them as illegal—a fact that spacefaring states (including the United States) take advantage of.

The Outer Space Treaty and the rest of the applicable space law establish few limitations on activities in outer space, leaving states essentially free to develop any defensive and offensive military capabilities they deem necessary to protect their national security interests in space, as long as such capabilities do not contravene international law, including the U.N. Charter, as stipulated in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. Under Article IV of the treaty, only the placement “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner” and “[t]he establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies” are prohibited. Beyond these regulations, the Outer Space Treaty does not say anything about the use of conventional weapons in the void of space; thus, states have interpreted that to be fair game as long as such weapons are not used aggressively against another space actor. ASAT testing is a result of this legal interpretation, which has garnered significant criticism over the years. Still, states have generally shied away from condemning such actions as illegal, most likely because they wish to retain the possibility of legally using ASAT technology themselves.

The use of weapons in space—as long as it is done within the bounds of the regulations described above—is legal. Nevertheless, the international community is aware of the dangers it poses. Even if an ASAT test is not directed against another nation’s technology, it serves as evidence that a state possesses the capabilities required for conducting attacks against others, should it wish to do so. Instead of serving as a deterrent, this ability to target or compromise another country’s space technology has raised tensions between adversaries. As Cassandra Steer, mission specialist with the Australian National University Institute for Space, points out, these capabilities, as well as the fear of possible reciprocation by adversaries, “have led to changes in domestic space policies and strategies by all key states and to an escalatory cycle of developing counterspace technologies, or a range of ways in which to target or interfere with each other’s space-based assets.”

The most noteworthy type of ASAT testing, which is also the one that has generated the most controversy in the international community, is the use of direct-ascent missiles (weapons designed to strike a satellite using a trajectory that intersects its target without placing the interceptor in orbit) such as the one Russia employed in its December demonstration. Four countries—the U.S., Russia, China and India—have conducted successful tests of this kind, although only the United States, China and India directed their missiles against actual objects—in all cases, satellites that belonged to the state conducting the test.

Russia, by contrast, has never conducted a kinetic kill ASAT test (involving the collision of the ASAT with its target satellite, which destroys both the ASAT and the satellite with the energy of the crash) against another space object, but it has carried out multiple successful test flights of the Nudol anti-ballistic missile—as the Dec. 15 test was presumed to be—which can be used as a defensive interceptor weapon but also has the ability to take down satellites in low Earth orbit, situated at an altitude of 160 to 2,000 kilometers (100 to 1,200 miles) above sea level.

All of these tests have provoked protests of varying degrees from the international community, but the most significant by far is the Become a supporter of IT Security News and help us remove the ads.