Thoughts on Detection Engineering
I read something online recently that suggested that the role of detection engineering is to reduce the false positive (FPs) alerts sent to the SOC. In part, I fully agree with this; however, “cyber security” is a team sport, and it’s really incumbent upon SOC and DFIR analysts to support the detection engineering effort through their investigations. This is something I addressed a bit ago in this blog, first here, and then here.
From the second blog post linked above, the most important value-add is the image to the right. This is something I put together to illustrate what, IMHO, should be the interaction between the SOC, DFIR, threat hunting, threat intel, and detection engineering. As you see from the image, the idea is that the output of DFIR work, the DFIR analysis, feeds back into the overall process, through threat intel and detection engineering. Then, both of those functions further feed back into the overall process at various points, one being back into the SOC through the development of high(er) fidelity detections. Another feedback point is that threat intel or gaps identified by detection engineer serve to inform what other data sources may need to be collected and parsed as part of the overall response process.
The overall point here is that the SOC shouldn’t be inundated or overwhelmed with false positive (FP) detections. Rather, the SOC should be collecting the necessary metrics (through an appropriate level of investigation) to definitively demonstrate that the detections are FPs, and the f
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