What’s Next for the Western Sahara Conflict?

On Dec. 10, Morocco scored a long-dreamed-of foreign policy victory. After decades of international impasse and intense lobbying, the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara territory, which Morocco has occupied since 1975. The U.S. recognition, in exchange for Morocco normalizing relations with Israel, opens a new chapter in an issue that has long been static. And it has implications not only for Morocco and the Polisario Front—which represents the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the government in exile that aims to govern Western Sahara—but also for those indirectly involved: Algeria, the United States and the European Union.

The deal does not end the conflict, nor will it affect the broader international status of Morocco’s claims. However, it does give Rabat a key practical victory. In gaining recognition for its annexation of Western Sahara, the kingdom achieved a central foreign policy objective without having to define the political terms of that annexation. The status of the Polisario Front, the rights of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria and the terms of the territory’s political status all remain unsettled. While these questions need to be resolved for a permanent solution, Morocco is able for now to bypass these thorny issues.

For the Polisario Front, the U.S. decision weakens its military and political position further—in what had already been a lopsided struggle. It diminishes opportunities for negotiations as Morocco, with the United States on it side, will have little incentive to compromise. For Algeria, the deal forces questions about the utility of its support for the Polisario. The quid pro quo aspect of the deal, which undermines Sahrawi and Palestinian rights, brings greater salience to Algeria’s ideological opposition to Morocco’s occupation. For Europe, the efforts to balance important Morocco-EU relationships with concern for Sahrawi human rights and support for their self-determination will become more difficult. And for the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and the incoming Biden administration, the announcement leaves few options but to stay the course.

Entrenched Views

The tangled history of the Western Sahara conflict goes back to colonial Spain. In November 1975, Spain moved ahead with plans to withdraw from the Spanish Sahara—later to be called Western Sahara. Shortly after that, Morocco moved in. Spain then granted shared control of the territory while the international community was calling for self-determination for the local Sahrawi population. In 1976, armed conflict arose between Morocco and the newly formed Polisario Front. The clashes initially engaged Mauritania, too. But by 1979, Mauritania, severely weakened by the armed struggle, abandoned its claims to the territory, leaving Morocco and the Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, locked in armed conflict.

Divergent postcolonial lenses still frame the conflict. Morocco sees Western Sahara as a question of arbitrary borders imposed by former colonial powers. Amid Spanish withdrawal from the region, Morocco moved to incorporate the area within its post-independence borders, claiming historical ties between Moroccan kings and the region’s tribes. Morocco’s pursuit of this “territorial integrity” became closely tied to the monarchy in the 1970s and 1980s, granting a sense of purpose—a unifying national struggle. This strategy was a direct result of the growing opposition to King Hassan II, who by 1975 had survived coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. The capture of Western Sahara marked the monarchy’s reassertion of control. The Polisario Front, however, which had fought to end Spanish colonial rule, views Moroccan occupation as another unlawful usurpation of their land by an outside power.

For Algeria, the issue is one of both ideological conviction and national security. Algeria, which fought its own long and bloody battle for independence, supports the principle of self-determination across postcolonial Africa. Western Sahara is no exception, and Algeria has hosted thousands of Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf and provided military and political support for the Polisario Front and the government currently in Tifariti. In terms of security, the Algerian military’s posture was shaped in part by its 1963 border war with Morocco. Algeria’s support for the Polisario Front served the practical purpose of keeping Moroccan expansionism in check. Algeria is not alone—some African states share the view that the issue of Western Sahara is an example of unfinished decolonization and support SADR in its pursuit of self-determination.

Morocco’s Gains

Untangling the history of the Western Sahara conflict demonstrates how much circumstances and clever diplomacy have favored Morocco over the years. The U.S. announcement adds to a string of incremental wins. After years of fighting, the U.N. brokered a cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Front in 1991. The cease-fire is still monitored by the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, whose Security Council-defined mandate includes holding a referendum to determine the area’s future. A referendum was intended to take place following a process of identifying who has the right to vote in such a referendum. However, Morocco was always wary that the vote would crystallize the region’s independence, despite years of trying to tip the population balance in its favor by encouraging migration south from other parts of Morocco and investing heavily in the territory.

Numerous attempts by the U.N. to broker a solution since the 1990s have consistently failed, largely due to disagreements over voting eligibility in the looming referendum. The latest of these in 2018 stalled quickly despite high-level engagement, reaffirming how entrenched each side is in its position. Over the years, Morocco has been clear that it would never accept full de jure Western Saharan independence. Instead, the kingdom championed autonomy for the territory under Moroccan sovereignty. However, Morocco still has to work out socioeconomic and human rights redress, as well as political reforms for which the country, despite its rhetoric, is not prepared. The U.S. recognition of its position, however, allows the kingdom to gain legitimacy to bolster its claims and continue its investment in the area and use of its resources, while sidestepping the challenges that would be required for a full resolution.

Notably, Morocco’s gradual gains have been coming from varied sources. With the EU, Morocco has been able to push back against a 2015 Polisario challenge at the European General Court over Morocco’s use of Western Saharan resources, particularly in fisheries deals with the European Union. The court challenge in the EU illustrated viable legal avenues through which the Polisario Front could draw attention to the unsettled nature of the conflict. However, Morocco’s successful appeal of the ruling essentially codified EU support for its control of the resources of an area that is not internationally recognized as its lawful territory.

At the same time, Morocco was turning to the African continent with a formal return to the African Union in 2016, which Morocco had left 32 years prior in protest of growing diplomatic support for and recognition of SADR. Through dogged diplomatic, economic and even religious outreach, Morocco was able to convince several African countries to either reverse their recognition of SADR or acknowledge Morocco’s control of the area. Finally, perhaps foreshadowing the White House deal, in November the United Arab Emirates opened a consulate in Laayoune—Morocco’s administrative capital and military headquarters in the area—another major diplomatic win. Bahrain soon followed, and Jordan will join next. While Gulf countries have always rhetorically supported Morocco in the conflict, recent actions grant Morocco official recognit

[…]

Read the original article: What’s Next for the Western Sahara Conflict?