According to the findings, AMD’s CPU may have kept “stale quotient data” within its registers even after the patchwork was over, consequently providing attackers with a window to retrieve private information. The original fix was to conduct a final “dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler.” The idea is quite straightforward: after completing the 0/1 division, which always yields zero results, any remaining old data would be eliminated.
The drawback of the fix, explained by Petkov, was that the speculative execution attack would have progressed too far by the time that the security feature took effect. There would already be some outdated data on AMD’s divider, which the attackers could access before the dummy division kicked in.
Petkov notes that his new solution now upholds that same division in several scenarios:
“Initially, it was thought that doing an innocuous division in the #DE handler would take care to prevent any leaking of old data from the divider but by the time t
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